dburn, on 2012-February-03, 15:32, said:
Some years ago I wrote words to this effect: the slower a call, the less happy the player making it is with the notion that it should be the final call in the auction. Some years later I see no reason to disagree with myself.
gordontd, on 2012-February-04, 03:38, said:
Do you think this reaches the point where, whenever a player selects a middle course, it demonstrably suggests bidding more?
And how does this idea apply to other situations (eg Bergen) where the call in question is artificial and not likely to become the final contract?
Even more years ago, before I had written the words I alluded to above, I chaired an appeal that had to rule on this situation:
North-South had bid 1NT (12-14) - 2NT (natural, invitational and slow) - 3NT. The opener had a complete minimum, the raiser had a ten count, the lie of cards was favourable though not quite favourable enough, but the defence was ridiculous and the contract made. The Director cancelled the 3NT bid on the basis that it was demonstrably suggested by the slow 2NT.
I was of the view that the 3NT bid should be allowed not because it was "not demonstrably suggested", but because the guy would never have bid it in a million years if he had any actual information about his partner's hand. And if he didn't have any information about his partner's hand, how could he be penalised for acting on unauthorised information about his partner's hand?
I was a little unhappy that if this line of thought became standard ruling procedure, the clever division would raise slowly to 2NT only on hands that wanted partner to pass with other than a complete maximum. But although still more than a little wet behind the ears, I knew enough to know that you couldn't actually stop the clever division from bending the rules (slow penalty doubles were penalty because they would bar partner, fast ones were optional because they would not). All you could hope was that they would do it often enough for the pattern to become apparent.
But it seemed to me, and I argued the case strongly enough to convince my fellow AC members, that this line of thought would actually solve quite a few problems. Assuming that a partnership was not playing reverse hesitations, then if it got a good result via an auction that it would never have conducted had it been communicating illegally (by standard hesitations or in some other way), that result should stand because there was no legal basis for amending it. Recall that the matter of breaks in tempo is merely a subset of the matter of illegal communication between partners; if there could not have been any of that, then there could not be a reason to adjust a score.
I learned the error of my ways in very short order. The Director, one Franklin by name, informed me that (and here I paraphrase): "we didn't rule on that basis; we ruled on the basis that someone who went on over a slow 2NT with a minimum was trying to cheat; and even if it turned out that the slowness of the raise was based on doubt as to whether to pass, not whether to bid game, we adjusted the score if the game made". (Of course, he meant that the score was always adjusted for the putative offenders; if the non-offenders had contributed by ridiculous actions, they might keep some or all of their bad result.) The Laws and Ethics Committee on reviewing the case confirmed that this was indeed correct procedure.
When I became a member of the said Committee, I came up with the formulation above in order to enshrine this procedure (despite my personal reservations): slow actions were in effect deemed demonstrably to suggest that partner take some further part in the auction, whether the hand on which the slow action was based actually wanted this to happen or not. The reasons I disagreed with myself then, I have outlined in the foregoing; the reason I do not disagree with myself now is that the procedure leads (as mine of all those years ago would) to consistency in giving rulings
provided that it is consistently followed, and as the philosopher remarked "Consistency is all I ask".
As to Bergen raises, a player might "raise" 1
♠ to (say) 3
♣ slowly (that is, after pulling out the Stop card and then thinking) for one of a number of reasons. As with a limit raise to 3
♠, he may be wondering whether he has one of those or a raise to 2
♠ or a raise to 4
♠; but he may also have been intending to make a pure limit raise to 3
♠ before remembering that he lives in some part of London south of Jeremy69A and therefore that 3
♠ is a pre-empt; or he may have been trying to recall which of 3
♣ and 3
♦ is the four-trump raise and which the three-trump raise; or... At any rate, I don't see how the Burn Formulation of the Franklin Procedure could apply to a forcing bid, but the question is an interesting one.